The geopolitical importance of these passages cannot therefore be measured simply by counting the vessels that cross them. A maritime chokepoint becomes strategically important through the interaction of several factors: the concentration of traffic, the availability or absence of alternative routes, exposure to political or military disruption, the capacity of states or other actors to interfere with navigation, and the systemic consequences that would follow from interruption. Hormuz expresses this relationship principally through energy dependence; Malacca through the enormous concentration of commercial and energy circulation between the Indian and Pacific oceans; Suez through the compression of distance between Europe and Asia; Bab el-Mandeb through the vulnerability of that system to relatively limited disruptive capabilities; Panama through the combination of engineered geography, infrastructure and environmental constraints. Different passages therefore produce different forms of vulnerability, but they share a fundamental characteristic: international systems have organised themselves around restrictive geography.

This raises a further question that deserves greater attention. Maritime strategy traditionally identifies the places upon which the world is already dependent. But what if strategically significant geography can be recognised before that dependence has fully developed?

This is the reasoning behind the concept of the latent chokepoint. An established chokepoint derives its geopolitical significance from existing dependence upon restricted geography. A latent chokepoint possesses the restrictive geography but exists at an earlier stage in the development of systemic dependence. Its present traffic may remain modest when compared with the great established maritime corridors, yet environmental change, technological development, infrastructure investment, commercial adaptation or great-power competition may progressively transform its strategic importance.

The distinction introduces an element that maritime geopolitical analysis frequently lacks: anticipation. Strategic attention should not begin only when dependence has already become entrenched. By that stage ports have been constructed, supply chains established, investments committed and political expectations formed around the route. The more demanding task is to recognise the geographical architecture of vulnerability while it is still developing.

The Arctic Changes the Map

The Arctic provides perhaps the most important contemporary environment in which to examine this possibility. For much of modern maritime history, extreme climatic conditions prevented the Arctic Ocean from becoming a major component of global commercial navigation. Its military and strategic importance was considerable, particularly during the Cold War, but its role within ordinary international shipping remained comparatively limited.

That distinction is becoming less absolute. Greater navigational accessibility, improvements in maritime technology, Russian investment in the Northern Sea Route, growing Asian interest in Arctic connectivity and increasing international attention to the High North are gradually changing the relationship between the Arctic and the wider maritime system.

This does not mean that northern routes are about to replace Suez, Malacca or the established arteries of global commerce. Such a conclusion would be premature. Arctic navigation continues to face substantial environmental, infrastructural, economic, insurance and political constraints. The more significant geopolitical observation is different: even partial development of an alternative maritime corridor can alter calculations concerning distance, resilience, diversification and strategic dependence.

And every alternative route creates its own geography. A vessel travelling from Northeast Asia towards Europe through the Russian Arctic may avoid several of the geographical concentrations associated with the traditional southern route. Yet if it enters the Arctic from the Pacific, it encounters another geographical restriction: the Bering Strait. Route diversification therefore does not necessarily eliminate chokepoint vulnerability. It can redistribute it.

Bering: A Gateway Before It Becomes a Chokepoint

Bering should not presently be placed in the same commercial category as Hormuz, Malacca or Suez. Its significance lies precisely in the fact that it is not yet comparable with them.

The strait occupies an extraordinary geographical position. It connects the Pacific and Arctic maritime spaces while separating the territories of the United States and Russia. Alaska forms its eastern strategic environment; the Russian Far East its western one. Beyond the strait lies the maritime system associated with the Northern Sea Route. Beyond its southern approaches lie the great industrial and trading economies of Northeast Asia.

This geography becomes still more significant when China is introduced into the equation. China possesses no Arctic coastline, but its economic scale, maritime dependence, scientific presence and declared interest in Arctic connectivity give it a potentially important relationship with the region. The result is an unusual geopolitical triangle. Russia possesses the western shore. The United States possesses the eastern shore. China could become an increasingly important economic user of the maritime corridor connecting the Pacific with the Arctic.

The three powers consequently approach the same geography from very different positions. For the United States, Bering is simultaneously an Arctic frontier, a Pacific gateway and a maritime space adjacent to sovereign American territory. For Russia, it is the eastern entrance to a northern maritime system extending along a vast Arctic coastline and closely connected with Russian ports, icebreakers, infrastructure and regulatory capabilities. For China, its significance lies not in territorial sovereignty but in access, diversification and the potential economic value of an additional Eurasian maritime connection.

None of this makes confrontation inevitable. Indeed, the maritime environment itself creates powerful reasons for cooperation. Navigation safety, environmental protection, search and rescue, hydrographic knowledge and predictable maritime rules serve common interests. Yet cooperation and strategic competition can coexist. This duality may become one of the defining characteristics of Arctic maritime geopolitics.

From Chokepoint Security to Chokepoint Anticipation

The importance of the latent-chokepoint concept extends beyond Bering. It suggests a different way of thinking about maritime security. Governments naturally devote attention to protecting passages upon which their economies are already dependent. Hormuz, Malacca, Suez and other established chokepoints consequently occupy permanent positions in strategic planning.

But resilience also requires identifying where new concentrations may emerge. Growing traffic is one indicator, but it is not sufficient. Infrastructure investment, changing climatic accessibility, new maritime technologies, resource exploitation, military deployments, commercial experimentation and shifts in great-power strategy can all reveal that the geopolitical value of a maritime space is changing. A passage that appears peripheral when measured only by today’s cargo volumes may occupy a central position in tomorrow’s maritime architecture.

Bering is particularly valuable as an analytical case because the geography already exists while the scale of future dependence remains uncertain. The correct question is therefore not whether Bering today equals Malacca. It clearly does not. The question is whether developments in Arctic navigation could progressively transform a geographically restricted passage between two major powers into a gateway upon which a larger system of maritime circulation begins to depend.

If that process occurs, institutions, infrastructure, maritime domain awareness, environmental safeguards and mechanisms for international cooperation will be easier to establish before dependence becomes acute than afterwards. Anticipation is therefore not prediction. It is preparation for a strategically credible possibility.

The Geography of Tomorrow

The international system cannot widen Hormuz. It cannot move Malacca. It cannot eliminate the geographical relationship connecting Bab el-Mandeb with Suez. And it cannot relocate Bering. What states can change is the political, institutional and strategic architecture constructed around these geographical realities.

For this reason, the geopolitics of maritime chokepoints must increasingly address two questions rather than one. The first remains indispensable: Which maritime passages concentrate the vulnerabilities of the international system today?

Where is tomorrow’s dependence beginning to concentrate?

If the Arctic becomes a more significant maritime space, Bering will increasingly reveal its deeper geographical character: the narrow Pacific entrance to an emerging oceanic system, situated between the United States and Russia and potentially serving the expanding commercial interests of China and other Asian maritime economies.

That configuration does not guarantee that the Bering Strait will become one of the defining chokepoints of the twenty-first century. But it makes the possibility strategically important enough to examine before the answer becomes obvious.

The established chokepoints tell us where globalisation has already become dependent upon geography.
Bering tells us where geography may be waiting for globalisation.

Research Note

This commentary develops themes examined in Artur Victoria’s research paper, Maritime Chokepoints and the Geopolitics of Global Vulnerability: Strategic Gateways, Systemic Risk and the Emerging Importance of the Bering Strait, Ocean Geopolitics Centre Research Paper 01/2026.

The complete Research Paper is available through Zenodo, ResearchGate and Academia.edu. The broader comparative study of the world’s principal maritime chokepoints is developed in the author’s recently published book under the Ocean Geopolitics Centre.

Artur Victoria
Ocean Geopolitics Centre
2026

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The Ocean Geopolitics Centre is pleased to announce the publication of Working Paper No. 003, entitled The Strategic Geography of Undersea Infrastructure: How Critical Seabed Systems Are Reshaping Global Power.

The publication examines one of the least visible yet most strategically important transformations taking place in international affairs. Beneath the world’s oceans lies an extensive network of submarine communication cables, offshore energy installations, electricity interconnectors, pipelines, seabed sensors and emerging underwater technologies that collectively sustain the functioning of the global economy.

While maritime geopolitics has traditionally focused on naval power and the control of sea lines of communication, this Working Paper argues that contemporary geopolitical competition increasingly depends upon the resilience, governance and protection of these interconnected undersea systems.

The paper introduces the concept of the Strategic Geography of Undersea Infrastructure, proposing a new analytical framework within Ocean Geopolitics for understanding how critical seabed infrastructure is reshaping the distribution of power in the twenty-first century.

Rather than viewing the oceans solely as spaces for navigation, the paper demonstrates that they have become integrated strategic environments where technology, infrastructure, security, economics and governance interact continuously. It explores the evolution of critical undersea infrastructure, examines its vulnerability to hybrid threats and infrastructure warfare, and considers its implications for strategic sovereignty and international maritime governance.

This publication forms part of the Ocean Geopolitics Centre’s ongoing research programme dedicated to advancing Ocean Geopolitics as an emerging multidisciplinary field of strategic studies.

Main Themes

• Ocean Geopolitics
• Strategic Geography of Undersea Infrastructure
• Critical Seabed Systems
• Submarine Communication Cables
• Infrastructure Resilience
• Hybrid Threats
• Strategic Sovereignty
• Maritime Governance
• International Security

Publication Details

Ocean Geopolitics Centre Working Paper No. 003
Author: Artur Victoria
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21452601

The complete Working Paper is freely available through Zenodo and contributes to the Ocean Geopolitics Centre’s Working Paper Series, which explores the changing geopolitical significance of the oceans and their role in the evolving architecture of global power.

Keywords: Ocean Geopolitics, Undersea Infrastructure, Maritime Security, Strategic Geography, Critical Seabed Systems, Strategic Sovereignty, Ocean Governance, Hybrid Threats, Blue Economy, Maritime Strategy.

Ocean Geopolitics Centre Working Paper Series

• Working Paper No. 001 – Ocean Geopolitics
• Working Paper No. 002 – Ocean Geopolitics as a New Multidisciplinary Discipline
• Working Paper No. 003 – The Strategic Geography of Undersea Infrastructure

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Beneath the world’s oceans lies an extensive and largely invisible network upon which modern civilisation depends. Submarine fibre-optic cables, energy pipelines, electricity interconnectors, offshore installations and underwater sensor systems sustain global communications, financial markets, international trade, energy security and national defence. Although these systems remain hidden from public view, they have become strategic assets at the centre of twenty-first-century geopolitical competition.

When national security is discussed, attention normally turns to armies, naval fleets, aircraft, satellites and territorial borders. However, some of the most important infrastructure supporting contemporary societies lies thousands of metres below the surface of the sea. This underwater domain is becoming a new strategic frontier in which technology, security, economic resilience and geopolitical rivalry increasingly converge.

The Hidden Foundation of Modern Civilisation

Critical underwater infrastructure consists of the physical and digital systems located on or beneath the seabed that are essential to the functioning of states, economies and societies. These systems include submarine telecommunications cables, gas and oil pipelines, electricity interconnectors, offshore energy installations, underwater monitoring equipment and increasingly sophisticated networks of civilian and military sensors.

Submarine fibre-optic cables form the central nervous system of the global digital economy. They carry international internet traffic, government communications, financial transactions, commercial data and information exchanged between institutions and individuals across continents. Despite the widespread perception that global communications depend mainly upon satellites, the physical infrastructure of digital globalisation remains deeply connected to the ocean floor.

Alongside these communication systems, underwater pipelines transport energy between countries, while electricity cables connect national grids and offshore renewable energy installations to land-based infrastructure. The seabed has therefore become an essential component of digital connectivity, energy security, economic activity and strategic sovereignty.

From Engineering Systems to Strategic Assets

For many years, underwater cables and pipelines were treated primarily as technical or commercial infrastructure. Their construction, operation and maintenance were generally regarded as matters for telecommunications companies, energy operators, engineers and regulatory authorities.

That perception is changing. As states and economies become increasingly dependent upon uninterrupted connectivity and energy flows, underwater infrastructure is being recognised as a strategic national asset. Disruption to a major cable, pipeline or electricity interconnector can affect several countries simultaneously, producing consequences for financial markets, communications, energy supplies, government operations and international commerce.

The strategic importance of these systems arises not only from their economic value but also from the dependencies they create. A society may possess strong armed forces and advanced institutions, yet remain vulnerable when essential digital and energy connections pass through infrastructure that is difficult to observe, defend or rapidly replace.

Why Underwater Infrastructure Is Vulnerable

Protecting underwater infrastructure is exceptionally difficult because these systems extend across enormous maritime areas. Many cables and pipelines travel thousands of kilometres, crossing national jurisdictions, exclusive economic zones and international waters. Some are located in shallow coastal areas exposed to shipping activity, anchoring and fishing operations, while others lie at great depths where inspection and repair are technically demanding.

Damage may result from natural events, equipment failure, maritime accidents or human activity. However, growing geopolitical tension has also increased concern about deliberate interference, sabotage, covert surveillance and hybrid maritime operations.

The difficulty of establishing responsibility creates an additional security challenge. Underwater incidents may occur far from direct observation, and identifying whether damage was accidental or intentional can require complex technical investigation. This uncertainty may allow hostile actors to operate below the threshold of conventional armed conflict while still causing significant economic and strategic disruption.

Submarine Cables and Digital Sovereignty

Submarine cables are among the most important components of contemporary globalisation. They enable governments, companies, universities, banks, media organisations and citizens to communicate across borders almost instantaneously. Modern financial systems depend upon the speed and reliability of these connections, while cloud computing, digital platforms and international data services require continuous access to global networks.

This dependence gives submarine cables a geopolitical significance extending far beyond telecommunications. Their routes, landing points, ownership structures and maintenance arrangements influence digital resilience and national sovereignty. States that depend heavily upon a small number of cable connections may face greater exposure to disruption, surveillance or external pressure.

Digital sovereignty therefore cannot be understood solely through software, data centres and national legislation. It must also include the physical maritime infrastructure through which data moves. The security of the digital state increasingly begins beneath the ocean.

Energy Infrastructure Beneath the Sea

The underwater domain is equally important to energy security. Offshore oil and gas installations, pipelines, electricity interconnectors and offshore wind farms are becoming central elements of national and regional energy systems.

As countries expand renewable energy production and develop interconnected electricity markets, offshore infrastructure will continue to grow in strategic importance. Wind farms, subsea electricity cables and energy islands may support decarbonisation, but they also create new dependencies that require protection and continuous monitoring.

An interruption affecting offshore energy infrastructure may influence domestic supply, industrial production, market prices and political stability. Energy security is therefore increasingly inseparable from maritime security, seabed awareness and infrastructure resilience.

Surveillance, Technology and Maritime Awareness

Protecting critical underwater infrastructure requires a substantially expanded form of maritime situational awareness. Traditional maritime surveillance has focused mainly on ships, coastal activity and surface navigation. The emerging security environment demands greater attention to what happens below the surface and on the seabed.

Autonomous underwater vehicles, remotely operated systems, seabed sensors, satellite observation, hydrographic information, acoustic monitoring and artificial intelligence can all contribute to detecting unusual activity and identifying potential threats.

Artificial intelligence is particularly important because maritime authorities must analyse enormous volumes of information originating from vessels, satellites, sensors, communications systems and environmental monitoring platforms. Intelligent systems can help identify anomalies, compare actual activity with expected patterns and support faster decisions when suspicious behaviour is detected.

Technology alone, however, cannot provide complete protection. Effective security also depends upon trained personnel, clear institutional responsibility, information sharing and coordinated operational procedures.

International Cooperation and Maritime Governance

Underwater infrastructure frequently connects several countries and crosses different legal jurisdictions. No state can protect the entire network independently. International cooperation is therefore essential.

Governments, naval forces, coastguards, port authorities, telecommunications companies, energy operators, research institutions and international organisations must exchange information and develop common approaches to prevention, surveillance, incident response and infrastructure repair.

Legal and governance questions remain particularly important. States must consider responsibility for protecting infrastructure located within territorial waters, exclusive economic zones and international maritime spaces. They must also determine how evidence should be collected, how attribution should be established and how public and private operators should coordinate during emergencies.

Resilience must become a central principle of maritime governance. This includes diversifying cable routes, strengthening landing stations, maintaining repair capacity, improving redundancy and ensuring that essential services can continue during periods of disruption.

A New Understanding of Maritime Security

The rise of critical underwater infrastructure requires a broader understanding of maritime security. Security at sea can no longer be defined only through naval power, freedom of navigation, port protection and the defence of shipping routes.

It must also include the protection of the invisible systems that sustain modern economies and societies. Maritime security now extends from the ocean surface to the seabed and from physical infrastructure to digital networks.

This development also changes the meaning of national resilience. A resilient state must understand where its critical connections are located, who owns and operates them, which alternative routes are available and how quickly damaged infrastructure can be restored.

The underwater domain is therefore becoming a meeting point between national defence, economic policy, technological sovereignty, energy strategy, cybersecurity and international cooperation.

Conclusion: The Seabed as a Strategic Domain

Critical underwater infrastructure represents one of the defining security challenges of the twenty-first century. Submarine cables, pipelines, electricity interconnectors, offshore installations and sensor networks form an invisible architecture upon which global communications, energy systems and international commerce increasingly depend.

The protection of these systems will require more than naval capability. It will demand technological innovation, institutional coordination, infrastructure redundancy, legal development, international cooperation and a deeper understanding of the geopolitical importance of the seabed.

The future of security will not be determined solely on land, in the air, in space or on the surface of the sea. It will also depend upon the ability of states and international institutions to understand, monitor and protect what lies beneath the oceans.

The security of modern societies increasingly begins on the ocean floor.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is critical underwater infrastructure?

Critical underwater infrastructure includes submarine telecommunications cables, energy pipelines, electricity interconnectors, offshore platforms, renewable energy installations and underwater sensor systems that support communications, trade, energy security and national defence.

Why are submarine cables strategically important?

Submarine fibre-optic cables carry the majority of international digital communications. Governments, financial markets, companies and public services depend upon them for secure and continuous global connectivity.

What can damage underwater infrastructure?

Damage may result from natural hazards, equipment failure, fishing activity, ship anchors, maritime accidents, sabotage or covert geopolitical operations.

How can countries protect underwater cables and pipelines?

Protection requires maritime surveillance, autonomous underwater technologies, satellite monitoring, international information sharing, infrastructure redundancy, repair capacity and cooperation between governments and private operators.

Why is the seabed becoming a geopolitical domain?

The seabed contains infrastructure, data routes, energy systems, strategic resources and military technologies. Control, surveillance and protection of these assets are becoming increasingly important to national security and international competition.

About the Ocean Geopolitics Centre

The Ocean Geopolitics Centre conducts independent and multidisciplinary research into maritime security, ocean governance, strategic sovereignty, emerging technologies, critical infrastructure, the blue economy and the geopolitical transformation of the world’s oceans.

This article accompanies the video Critical Underwater Infrastructure: The Hidden Battlefield, produced as part of the Centre’s continuing programme of research, education and public engagement.

Ocean Geopolitics Centre
Understanding the Oceans. Shaping Strategic Thinking.

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